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This  paper  targets  policymakers  and  their  advisors  as  well  as  academic 
economists.  It seeks to combine methodological lessons for economists and non-
economists  with  analysis  of  real-world  issues  and  policy  advice.    It  advocates 
systemic  thinking  and  indicates  principles  for  systemic  analysis  without  fully 
developing such an analysis (which would require a book-length treatment).  It tackles 
issues  that  arouse  great  passions  and  require  the  transcendence  of  disciplinary 
boundaries;  systemic  thinking  may  help  us  overcome  our  emotional  biases  and 
professional narrowness.
The generation of plant breeders, other agronomic experts, and their managers 
who did pioneering work in the early years of the International Agricultural Research 
Centres and the latter years of their predecessor institutions may today feel nostalgic.  
Gone forever are the halcyon days of the Green Revolution, when they did not need to 
worry  about  intellectual  property,  multinationals  that  constitute  formidable 
concentrations  of  assets  and  resources  of  all  sorts,  national  governments  overly 
protective  and  possessive  of  their  genetic  resources,  universities  demanding 
something in return for sharing their most prized inventions, tedious legalities, and a 
multitude of related hassles and headaches.  How can we historically interpret these 
changes?  How can we usefully formulate the problems and opportunities confronting 
the relevant decision-makers?  What are the missions, strengths and weaknesses of the 
Centres and the nonprofit global innovation system in which they are embedded?  We 
must consider all of these questions as we address the question of primary interest to 
this  paper:  What  are  the  main  problems,  principles,  concepts  and  solutions  that 
characterise the intellectual property challenges that the Centres currently face?  This 
paper  is  not  intended  to  be  a  normative  exercise  in  the  sense  of  endorsing  or 
criticising the Centres’ strategies.  This is because I take their missions as given.  An 
attempt  at  identifying  their  missions  and  finding  optimal  intellectual  property 
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strategies given those missions can be regarded as a positive exercise (even though 
such an exercise is shrouded in uncertainty and subjective historical interpretation of 
ongoing processes). 
1. Strategic Sketch of the CG System
1.1 The CG System’s Environment: A Tale of Five Revolutions
2  
The historical background to this paper lends itself well to being interpreted 
and narrated in terms of five “revolutions.”  This rather grandiose term should not be 
used lightly, but each of the broad historical trends highlighted here is so dramatic and 
fast-paced as to be truly revolutionary.
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR, or 
CG for short), formed in 1971, and its research centres (CG Centres), played a pivotal 
role in the widespread introduction of high-yielding crop varieties known as the Green 
Revolution.  They could play this role thanks in part to a global network of transfers 
among institutions active in agricultural research and development (R&D) of data, 
genetic resources, technologies, and human capital.  These transfers were unimpeded 
by  intellectual  property  (IP)  obstacles.    The  biotechnology,  information  and 
communication technology (ICT), and IP revolutions, all of which gathered pace in 
the  1980s  and  accelerated  in  the  1990s,  have  drastically  changed  the  strategic 
environment for the CG Centres.  In the new environment – still in flux today – all 
Centres face a series of difficult choices relating to IP.
The biotech, ICT, and IP revolutions are closely interrelated.  Since 1980, IP 
protection for inventions involving living things has been strengthened, especially in 
the  United  States  (Binenbaum  et  al.  2000:9ff.).    This  has  stimulated  private 
investment in agricultural and biotech R&D.  The direction of causation between the 
IP  and  biotech  revolutions  runs  both  ways:  biotechnology  has  yielded  improved 
technological means for enforcement of IP pertaining to living things (Wright 1998).  
The improved IP incentives combined with the expanding technological opportunities 
afforded by biotech have contributed to the ascendancy of the private sector.  While 
agricultural  R&D  used  to  be  mainly  a  public-sector  activity,  global  private 
agricultural R&D investments have come to exceed those of the public sector (Alston, 
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Pardey & Smith 1998).  The ICT revolution intersects with the biotech revolution in 
areas  such  as  genomics,  proteomics,  and  bioinformatics.    In  addition,  recently 
developed databases and software are now linking Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) to the mapping and conservation of in situ genetic resources, thus enhancing an 
important set of inputs into agricultural R&D.  Various forms of IP protection pertain 
to databases and software (Longhorn, Henson-Apollonio & White 2002).
The  trend  to  claim  IP  over  genetic  resources  has  been  likened  to  earlier 
“enclosures” – historical processes of appropriation of hitherto public goods (Herdt 
1999).  Both the private and public sectors are playing an active role in this trend. 
While  IP  provides  incentives  for  incentives,  it  may  also  hamper  subsequent 
innovation that builds on the technologies protected by it.  Complementary IP assets 
often need to be combined for innovative activities; the dispersion of these among 
many owners gives rise to a complex of incentive problems that has been called the 
“tragedy  of  the  anticommons”  (Heller  &  Eisenberg  1998).    Complementarities 
between IP and other assets in the hands of multiple owners may have encouraged the 
wave of mergers and acquisitions in the agricultural biotech industry in the 1990s 
(Graff, Rausser & Small 2002).  Thus, currently, the ag-biotech industry is marked by 
a high degree of concentration, with half a dozen of multinationals controlling a large 
proportion of patented technologies.
The public sector has become more territorial.  Partly as a consequence of the 
1993 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) countries may be tempted to stake 
out  claims  to  their  genetic  resources.    A  1994  agreement  between  the  Food  and 
Agriculture  Organization  (FAO)  and  CG  Centres  stipulates  that  Centres  and  their 
clients may not seek IP rights (IPR) over so-called “designated” genetic resources 
held “in trust” in the Centres’ genebanks on behalf of humankind.  This “in-trust 
agreement” thus aims to reassure countries that their contributed genetic resources 
won’t be appropriated by anyone; such incentives may however not be sufficient to 
guarantee a continued smooth flow of genetic materials to the Centres (Binenbaum & 
Pardey 2003b).  In 2001, a draft International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources was 
adopted by 116 nations. It lists 64 crops and plants that are to be included in a pool of 
genetic resources which will be freely available to plant breeders in countries that 
adopt the treaty, in exchange for royalties if the seeds are used to develop commercial 
varieties.  Determining these royalties implies keeping track of breeding pedigrees, an 
issue yet to be resolved.  In the United States, the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act encouraged 4
federally funded research institutions to seek IP over their inventions.  Partly as a 
consequence of this Act, patenting by some universities has increased dramatically 
(Mowery et al. 2001).  Negotiating use rights for publicly held intellectual property 
can  be  more  problematic  than  for  IP  held  by  private  firms:  public  agencies  like 
universities  may be  hamstrung  by  regulations  or  bureaucracies,  or  royalty-sharing 
arrangements  with  faculty  (Binenbaum  &  Pardey  2003b;  Nottenburg,  Pardey  & 
Wright 2001).
The  biotech,  ICT  and  IP  revolutions  have  necessitated  an  associated  
management revolution among all organisations (for-profit and nonprofit, private and 
public) active in the life sciences.  With the rise of the Internet, the costs of initiating 
and  managing  inter-organisational  partnerships  have  been  greatly  reduced.    As 
already pointed out, the need to combine complementary technology-related assets 
has been partly met in the private sector through mergers and acquisitions.  However, 
indications are that that all players, even the largest firms, still need partnerships with 
all of the categories of players (other large firms, smaller firms, advanced research 
institutes, national agricultural research systems (NARS), and international centres) to 
access  complementary  assets  and  optimally  develop  new  technologies.    The  core 
insight from econometric studies conducted in the mid-1990s (Clarysse, Debackere & 
van Dierdonck 1996; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr 1996) that networks of inter-
organisational partnerships have become critical to successful innovation in the life 
sciences, even for the largest players, still seems equally relevant to the life sciences 
today and is corroborated by large amounts of more recent, albeit more anecdotal 
evidence.
The  acceleration  of  technological  change  in  the  life  sciences  and  the 
fragmentation of IP, capabilities, and other assets, mean that it is becoming more and 
more  critical  for  technologically  innovative  organisations  to  have  (1)  internal  and 
external scanning capability; (2) the ability to absorb the scanned information and 
render  it  useful  for  research  and  management  purposes;  and  (3)  the  ability  to 
effectively partner with other organisations, to innovate collaboratively, and to absorb 
and use the knowledge and information thus generated.  Organisations need to find 
out who is doing what, identify and locate technological challenges and opportunities, 
and make informed research agenda and IP choices.
In summary, the combined effect of the ICT, IP, and biotech revolutions is that 
for R&D organisations in the life sciences to be successful, they must meet far higher 5
standards in their management of partnerships and information systems than, say, two 
decades  ago.    Thus,  these  three  revolutions  have  necessitated  a  management 
revolution.    The  CG  System  and  Centres  may  need  to  undergo  this  management 
revolution in order to continue playing a significant role in the Green Revolution’s 
follow-up.
1.2 History, Mission, Research Agenda
The CG System is a network of sixteen independent Centres, their donors, 
additional  members,  and  a  set  of  System-wide  services.    The  sponsors  and  co-
sponsors are (mostly) rich countries, international organisations, and a small number 
of  private  charitable  foundations.    Additional  members  are  mostly  developing 
countries.
Rooted in pioneering efforts dating back to the early post-World-War-II years, 
the  CG  System  started  out  in  1971  with  just  a  few  Centres  which  focussed  on 
development of high-yielding varieties of a small set of major crops – rice, wheat, 
maize,  cassava,  and  pastures  –  for  developing  countries.    Such  productivity 
improvements,  if  implemented, generate  a  mix  of  producer surplus  and  consumer 
surplus, and thus may help both poor farmers and poor consumers.
3  The CG System 
thus  is  essentially  a  conduit  for  development  assistance  –  it  has  been  from  its 
beginning  and  still  is.    The  System  is  linked  to  NARS  partners  throughout  the 
developing world.
The CG’s agenda has been expanded in five major ways.  First, soon after its 
beginning,  the  CG  System  began  to  encompass  R&D  activities  other  than  crop-
varietal  improvement  that  were  equally  geared  towards  increasing  agricultural 
productivity in the developing world.  Added research agenda items included, for 
example, livestock-related research and improvement of irrigation technologies and 
farming systems.  Second, a series of crops – e.g. chickpeas, sorghum, potato, and 
millets – were added to the CG’s plant breeding portfolio, which now includes 27 
commodities (CGIAR 2003).  Third, an important extension to the CG’s research 
agenda that was added from the early 1980s onwards is natural resource management 
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(NRM).    The  initial  Green  Revolution  has  been  criticised  for  its  unintended 
environmental effects.  A general trend since the early 1980s in agricultural policy 
and  agricultural  R&D  (Alston,  Pardey  &  Smith  1998)  as  well  as  in  development 
assistance is an increase in attention to NRM.  It is now the mainstream view in 
agricultural research policy for the developing world that the research agenda should 
encompass some kind of environmental sustainability.  A “doubly green revolution”, 
combining  agricultural  productivity  with  environmental  considerations  (Conway 
1999), has now become the norm among relevant stakeholders.  This trend is reflected 
in  the  CG  System’s  missions  and  research  agendas.    Fourth,  the  CGIAR  has 
developed a major genetic resource conservation component.  Its ex situ germplasm 
collections, originating from an impressive range of agro-ecological environments, 
comprise a significant contribution to worldwide efforts to conserve agro-biodiversity.  
The CG’s genebank activities are closely interconnected with its breeding programs, 
but they also serve an independent genetic resource conservation function on behalf of 
humankind including its future generations.  Efforts are underway to fund this role of 
the CG System through a separate mechanism.  Fifth, biotechnology has become a 
significant component of the CG System’s activities (Morris & Hoisington 2000).
The current mission statements and budget allocations of the CGIAR and of 
all  of  the  Centres
4  reflect  a  remarkable  degree  of  consensus  as  to  the  System’s 
mission.  This consensus can be summarised as follows.  First, the dominant aspect of 
the System’s R&D agenda is still agricultural productivity enhancement intended to 
benefit the poor.  Second, this is augmented by research into the sustainability of 
agricultural systems.  Third, the System’s genetic resource conservation component is 
recognised as a separate function that merits a separate funding mechanism.
 Crop-varietal  improvement,  the  System’s  original  focus,  is  still  the  most 
important activity category in the System in budgetary terms.  Eight of the System’s 
sixteen Centres
5 as well as a subsidiary organisation of a ninth Centre
6 have a primary 
mandate in crop improvement.  Three of the other Centres focus on social science, 
policy advice, and management issues
7 that relate to the System’s mission, while the 
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6 INIBAP, which is part of IPGRI, has a networking role in Musa improvement.
7 IFPRI, IPGRI and ISNAR.7
remaining five Centres
8 each have idiosyncratic applied research mandates that cannot 
be summarised under a single heading.
Crops that exhibit large exports in value terms from developing countries to 
rich  countries,  such  as  coffee,  cocoa,  soybeans  and  Cavendish  bananas,  are  not 
included in the CG research agenda (Binenbaum et al. 2003).  On the other hand, 
Naylor et al. (2003) assert that the CG System has under-invested in so-called “orphan 
crops” – crops that are commercially so unattractive that they are ignored by private-
sector R&D.  In budgetary terms, the CG has largely focused on an intermediate 
group of important staple crops, in particular rice, maize, wheat, and potatoes, that are 
not  big  foreign  exchange  earners  but  do  have  large  domestic  markets  in  the 
developing world.  Such technology positioning choices matter to IP strategy.  The 
crops that receive the most R&D funding in the CG System are also important crops 
in domestic markets in rich countries, albeit in different varieties.  These are among 
the  crops  in  which  the  R&D  spending  and  IP  holdings  of  multinationals  are 
concentrated.
There is a mostly clear division of labour among the Centres, each of which 
has a unique mandate.   Each is an independent and legally incorporated organisation 
with one headquarters campus plus activities in several countries.  Since the CG’s 
beginning, there have been collaborations and exchanges among Centres.  However, 
Centres are often each other’s competitors on the funding market, and in the late 
1990s there was a perception that collaboration between Centres’ was suboptimal.  To 
encourage more inter-Centre collaboration (and to tap into new funding sources), a 
new  funding  mechanism  was  designed:  competitive  grants  for  so-called  Global 
Challenge  Programs,  which  require  participation  of  more  than  one  Centre 
(Binenbaum & Pardey 2003b).
The CGIAR as such is not a legal entity but rather a network.  System-wide 
decisions are taken by consensus among sponsors and members.  A number of units 
provide system-wide services.  Most of these units, including two that are relevant in 
the present context – namely the Central Advisory Service on Intellectual Property 
(CAS-IP) and the CGIAR Information Officer (CIO) – are now being integrated into a 
newly created CGIAR System Office (CGIAR 2002).  
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1.3 IP Policies (Introduction)
The CGIAR and its Centres began formulating official principles for their IP 
policies in the early 1990s (CGIAR 2000b).  These have been revised several times.  
Their general thrust has been a reluctance to claim IPR and a commitment to produce 
global public goods – freely accessible to all.  In the 1990s, proliferating IP claims 
caused CG policymakers to become increasingly concerned about the functioning of 
the global network of transfers of germplasm, technologies and data.  It was thus only 
in the late 1990s that the CG System and Centres began to seriously address IP.  CAS-
IP was established in 1999 and several Centres began investing in IP management 
activities.  As further argued below, these can be considered partial and tentative steps 
in the management revolution that the CG System may need to undergo. 
2. How to Think About IP Strategy?
9
The requisite management revolution should, of course, be underpinned by 
sound abstract reasoning and applied analysis.  But where in the academic literature 
can we find the conceptual tools required to develop an analytical foundation for the 
Centres’  IP  strategy  design?    This  question  is  not  easily  answered.    We  need  to 
combine insights from several disciplines and we need to find or develop some sort of 
framework for integrating these insights.
2.1 Systemic Thinking
What academic discipline(s) study IP strategy?  “Law” may seem an obvious 
answer.  It is true that IP is a legal category, and legal expertise is indispensable in IP 
strategy design.  However, “IP” is not the same thing as “IP strategy”.  IP strategy is 
closely interrelated with decisions involving technology positioning, funding, public 
relations,  etc.    In  other  words,  decision-makers  often  face  nested  choices  that 
simultaneously involve IP, technology, funding, etc.  Thus, to fully understand IP 
strategy,  technology  positioning,  funding,  etc.,  we  need  an  academic  field  that 
integrates law, technology, finance, etc., in the study of managerial decision-making.  
That field has a name: strategic management.  But most of the strategic management 
literature, including the part that addresses IP issues, focuses on the for-profit sector.  
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There is a literature on strategic management of nonprofits, but it appears to have 
somewhat neglected IP issues.
How does economics fit in?  While there is an institutional separation in many 
universities  between  management  studies  and  economics,  the  former  should  be 
viewed as a subset of the latter.  Just as economics studies consumer behaviour, it 
studies managerial decision-making.  However, management studies and economics 
have  historically  evolved  to  embrace  different  methodologies.    Most  economists 
appear  to  have  a  preference  for  parsimonious  modelling  based  on  simplifying 
assumptions, thus generating testable hypotheses.  In contrast, the field of strategic 
management endeavours to incorporate insights from many disciplines.  It integrates 
those  insights  not  through  mathematical  models  but  through  systemic  thinking.  
Systemic thinking and its main strengths can be characterised as follows.  Systemic 
thinking attempts not to overlook (1) relevant types of components of systems and (2) 
relevant  types  of  the  interrelationships  of  these  components;  by  striving  for 
completeness in this sense, it stimulates Gestalt intuition and thinking on the system 
as  a  whole,  and  is  capable  of  integrating  many  disparate  insights  and  details.  
Systemic thinking thus involves the use of taxonomies and conceptual models (e.g. 
flow charts).  To be sure, systemic thinking can be fully mathematical, as in general 
equilibrium  theory;  but  due  to  the  simplifying  assumptions  necessary  to  render 
completely mathematical systems, this sort of approach does not appear to be relevant 
in the present context.
The present paper owes much to the style of reasoning common in business 
strategy case studies.  It is eclectic, incorporating any relevant insights.  It perceives 
organisations’ strategic outlook  in terms of internal strengths and weaknesses and 
external threats and opportunities.
A number of recent papers address the IP challenges confronting nonprofit 
agricultural  R&D  (Barton  and  Berger  2001;  Binenbaum  et  al.  2000;  Byerlee  and 
Fischer  2001;  CGIAR  1998;  Falcon  2001;  Nottenburg,  Pardey  and  Wright  2001; 
Wright 2000).  With one possible exception, they were co-authored by economists.  
These papers convey many interesting insights, but they are all essentially collections 
of  ad  hoc  observations  without  a  clear  analytical  framework.    Are  these  papers 
perhaps  deficient  in  that  they  fail  to  mathematically  develop  and  empirically  test 
hypotheses?  No, that wouldn’t work: the scope of their discussions would require the 
(excessively costly or infeasible) testing of large numbers of hypotheses.  What they 10
lack is an explicitly systemic perspective.  According to a methodological view that is 
perhaps  widely  shared  among  economists,  the  point  of  positive  economics  is  to 
develop and test hypotheses.  In this view, the set of received economic knowledge 
consists of hypotheses that have not been rejected so far.  However, there is a danger 
in  this  methodological  principle,  which  is  that  economists  may  pay  insufficient 
attention  to  the system  into  which  the  hypotheses  fit.    They  may  not  sufficiently 
appreciate the value of work that focuses on taxonomic and systemic features.
In  summary,  a  major  element  that  is  missing  in  existing  contributions  by 
economists  on  IP  challenges  facing  nonprofits  involved  in  agricultural  R&D  is  a 
systemic perspective.
In fact, certain schools of thought of (what is recognised as) economics do 
think in systemic terms, without overly reducing systemic complexity.  Especially 
relevant  in  the  present  context  is  the  innovation  systems  literature  (reviewed  in 
Archibugi,  Howells  &  Michie  1999).
10    Its  approach  is  to  identify  categories  of 
players in an innovation system, interactions between them, innovation processes and 
rules governing these, and economic impacts.  Hypothesis generation and testing is 
embedded in a systemic perspective.
Systemic thinking matters to the IP management of individual CG Centres –
even though each of them is only a small player on a global scale – for the following 
reasons.    First,  the  evolution  of  agricultural  technology  and  underlying  scientific 
knowledge takes place in a global system.  To understand technology positioning and 
IP matters, it is necessary to understand this system.  Second, CG Centres’ missions 
require a public policy perspective.  Third, as explained in the following subsection, 
the  relational  nature  of  IP  strategy  implies  that  even  a  single  choice  problem 
considered in isolation has systemic ramifications.
2.2  Relational Thinking and Game Theory
Any rationale of IP strategy is ultimately based on inter-organisational (and 
interpersonal) interactions.  All of the reasons to seek IP protection and all of the 
options available to deal with the problem of accessing proprietary technology (i.e., 
technology protected by IP) can and should be viewed in terms of inter-organisational 
relations. (This is illustrated below.)  Relational thinking requires a taxonomy of inter-
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organisational  relations.    Relation  types  include  transfers  (gift  or  exchange), 
adversarial relations (including competition), collusion, coordination, collaboration, 
catalysis (provision of positive incentives) and discouragement (negative incentives). 
These relation types can be combined to form a variety of hybrids.
Inter-organisational interactions are games.  To understand them requires a 
balance between hard-nosed game analysis that assumes opportunism and approaches 
that give pride of place to cultural and social aspects of behaviour.  Game theory has 
begun to incorporate insights from the other social sciences. 
Let me give two examples of the relevance of game theory to IP strategy.  
Suppose a Centre (say C) is in possession of a piece (say P) of IP of clear importance 
to  a  prospective  partner,  a  firm  (say  F).    Consider  the  design  of  a  collaborative 
agreement between C and F.  C contributes inter alia P, and F contributes inter alia
money.    But  how  much  money  will  F  contribute?    Well,  that  is  determined  in 
negotiations.    But  how  can  C  know  in  those  negotiations  how  much  to  ask  for?  
Clearly, C must have some idea of P’s value to F.  This situation can be reduced to a 
game model where C sells (use rights to) P to F.  At the core of such a model is an 
informational asymmetry, and C needs to find a mechanism for revelation of the other 
side’s information.  In case F has competitors, the mechanism may be an auction; but 
revelation mechanisms can also be found in successive offers in bargaining models.  
The difference could be one (to put this point in stark terms) of a 100-million dollar 
project with a proper revelation mechanism, or a 1-million dollar project without one.  
The value of a revelation mechanism could be as much as $99 million more to be used 
for R&D in this project.
The  second  example  concerns  the  optimal  strategy  in  repeated  Prisoners’ 
Dilemmas (PD).  Axelrod (1984) reports that in a tournament of computer programs 
involving repeated games with PD payoffs, a simple strategy called “Tit for Tat” beat 
all other strategies.  Tit for Tat involved instantly rewarding cooperation and instantly 
punishing non-cooperation.   This and other insights from game theory are applicable 
in organisational strategy without explicitly modelling game-like situations.
Relational thinking is applicable to all IP problems.  A prominent example in 
is the problem of proprietary inputs.  This problem is better formulated as “How can a 
Centre deal with the apparent need for a technology/set of proprietary inputs?” rather 
than  “How  to  access  a  technology/set  of  proprietary  inputs?”  because  the  former 
formulation leaves open  more options.  As a first step, available options  must be 12
identified.  Analysis can then proceed in terms of relational interactions associated 
with  each  option  (for  further  discussion,  see  Binenbaum  &  Pardey  2003b  and 
Nottenburg, Pardey & Wright 2002).
First,  the  Centre  may  negotiate  with  the  input’s  owner  for  a  license.  The 
relation type is gift or exchange. 
Second, the Centre may unilaterally access the technology.  This may lead to a 
adversarial relationship; repercussions might ensue.
Third, the Centre might be able to contest the IPR either in court or at the IP-
granting agency.
Fourth, the Centre may attempt to invent around the technology.  This may 
result  in  a  valuable  asset  in  exchange  or  collaborative  relations  with  other 
organisations.  It may also lead to a reduction in value of the original technology and 
hence a loss to its owner.
Note that even when any of the potentially adversarial moves (the second, 
third or fourth options) are not carried out, they may still play a role as implied, 
perceived, or explicit threats, in combination with one or more of the other options.
Fifth, the Centre may initiate  a bilateral or multilateral R&D collaboration 
(another relation type) with the input’s owner; use rights to the input may be included 
in the partnership.   Segmentation is likely to be important.  
Sixth,  the  Centre  may  initiate  a  consortium  (another  relation  type)  and 
participate in it.  The consortium may include other parties that would like to access 
the proprietary input,  and  may either  focus on  this  particular input  or  have some 
broader  theme.    Note  that  the  consortium  can  also  be  used  for  accessing  other 
proprietary inputs and for R&D.
Seventh, the Centre may abandon the R&D program if the input is both critical 
and inaccessible, and do nothing.
Eighth,  the  Centre  may  abandon  the  R&D  program,  but  catalyse  (another 
relation type) other—nonprofit or for-profit—organisations better able to deal with 
the input problem to undertake the R&D program instead.  This may involve the other 
organisations’ use of any of the first six options.  
 Finally,  specific  funding  (another  relation  type)  opportunities  might  be 
available in combination with some of the aforementioned options.  For example, 
perhaps the home government of the input’s owner might be willing to help subsidize 
use of the input.13
Thus, a single seemingly simple problem necessitates consideration of a wide 
variety of relations and institutional solutions, and thus has systemic ramifications.  
Essentially, each option initiates a game, and any further analysis is bound to benefit 
from  game-theoretic  insights.    This  is  true  not  only  for  the  non-cooperative 
approaches, but also for the cooperative approaches (for example, the fourth and fifth 
options).
2.3 Costs and Benefits, Incentive Problems, and a Public Policy Perspective
The above example illustrates the first two steps of dealing with an ill-defined 
choice  problem:  finding  a  correct  formulation  of  the  problem  (one  that  does  not 
preclude relevant options) and listing all options.  A next logical step is cost-benefit 
reasoning: assessing costs and benefits associated with options.
Consider a two-option problem: whether or not to seek IP for a given output.  
This problem can be analysed in terms of the costs and benefits of IP protection.  
Again, taxonomic completeness is important: relevant cost and benefit items should 
not  be  overlooked.    (This  point  bears  repetition  in  view  of  the  preference  many 
economists have for “parsimonious” approaches.)  A list of cost and benefit items that 
matter to Centres’ IP choices is provided below.  The point to be made here is that 
most of the items in that list refer to positive or negative effects IP choices have on 
inter-organisational  interactions.    Game  theory,  balanced  with  or  integrated  with 
insights  from  the  social  sciences,  provides  the  tools  for  understanding  such 
interactions.
It  is  due  to  incentive  problems  that  the  application  of  game  theory  to  IP 
strategy may be valuable.  By overcoming incentive problems, the pursuit of social 
objectives such as the Centres’ mission fulfillment can be greatly enhanced.  One 
category of incentive problems is asymmetric information.  The above example about 
a  revelation  mechanism  hints  at  the  value  of  game  theory  in  solving  incentive 
problems such as those connected to asymmetric information.  This class of incentive 
problems is the subject of a literature, summarized and reviewed in Salanié (1997), 
which typically employs the assumption of opportunism (Williamson 1985:47).
Other classes of incentive problems are potentially relevant to IP strategy as 
well.  For this reason, it is useful to have a checklist of incentive problems.  The major 
groupings here are externalities including public goods, market power, informational 
asymmetry giving rise to moral hazard, adverse selection or signaling, game dynamics 14
(including  holdups,  commitment  problems,  punishment  strategies,  lying,  and 
sabotage), and problems associated with cognitive limitations.  A fundamental cause 
of incentive problems is opportunism or, more generally, divergence of objectives in 
relations.    Dedication  to  a  common  purpose,  a  commitment  to  veracity  and 
transparency, and other non-opportunistic motivations, may be affected by the setup 
and  dynamics  of  the  relationship  (Binenbaum,  Pardey  &  Wright  2001).    Such 
endogeneity of motivation can be accommodated by game theory.  Trust – the belief 
that the other side to a partnership will act in non-opportunistic ways or in accordance 
with long-term enlightened self-interest – and the projection of trustworthiness may 
often  be  key  criteria  in  partner  choice  and  key  success  factors  in  partnerships 
(Nooteboom  2002);  this  is  confirmed  by  managers  in  the  CG  System  (David 
Hoisington, pers.com.; Aart van Schoonhoven, pers. com.).
In summary, in analysing the CG System’s IP strategies and consequently its 
inter-organisational  relations,  we  must  find  a  balance  between  traditional  game-
theoretic approaches that assume opportunism and more socially oriented approaches 
that take into account non-opportunistic motivations.
Policy analysis can benefit from a checklist of incentive problems, as it is easy 
to  overlook  policy  rationales.    For  example,  the  traditional  rationale  for  the  CG 
System’s existence appears to be a combination of distributive justice and a public-
goods conception of its research products.  Because of the IP revolution, this story 
must  be  amended  and  extended.    IP  has  raised  the  appropriability  of  research 
products, thus weakening the traditional rationale.  Each type of incentive problem 
may contribute to market failure and inefficiencies and may thus serve as a rationale 
for public or nonprofit action.  The anticommons is an amalgam of different types of 
incentive problems.  Problems that might prevent complementary IP assets dispersed 
among many owners from being combined include, for example, hold-ups,
11 cognitive 
biases
12, and informational asymmetries.
In game-theoretic terms,  partnerships are cooperative equilibria in repeated 
games.    The  Folk  Theorem  shows  that  in  repeated  games  with  uncertain  horizon 
multiple equilibria are possible, with some being Pareto improvements over others.  
The public sector, say, the CG System, may thus have a role in stimulating the players 
                                                
11 Player A may improve its bargaining position by waiting until others have agreed to combine their 
assets, which then still need to be combined with A’s assets.
12 Heller  &  Eisenberg    (1999)  cite  studies  that  indicate  that  organisations  tend  to  rate  their  own 
capabilities higher than their prospective partners do, giving rise to difficulties in reaching a deal.15
to achieve a high equilibrium rather than a low one.  It may encourage the multilateral 
exchange of information, which can be viewed as a Prisoners’ Dilemma in which each 
player has an incentive to withhold information.
2.4 Bundle Thinking and Portfolio Thinking
A full systemic perspective on IP strategy encompasses technological as well 
as  inter-organisational  connections.    Salient  principles  regarding  technological 
connections include bundle thinking and portfolio thinking.
According to bundle thinking, technologies come in bundles composed of four 
elements: (a) codified information; (b) human capital, especially tacit knowledge; (c) 
material items embodying the technology; (d) IP – rights to use and benefit from the 
technology.  IP rights are often used to strengthen the IP owner’s positions in other 
elements of the bundles.  Bundle thinking implies that the CG’s biotech IP issues can 
only be understood in conjunction with germplasm flows.
Portfolio thinking pertains to IP issues on both the input side and the output 
side.  The problem of proprietary inputs should ideally be addressed not as a series of 
ad  hoc  decisions  but  in  an  integrated  fashion,  by  considering  the  set  of  needed 
proprietary inputs  as  a  whole.    This  requires  a  complete  inventory  of  proprietary 
inputs  for  which  Centre  researchers  perceive  there  to  be  a  need.    This  inventory 
should be subject to frequent review, a relatively low-cost exercise if it is embedded 
as an organisational routine.  This inventory can then be coupled with a stream of 
information  on  external  sources  for  the  inputs.    Similarly, on  the  output  side,  all 
valuable  technology-related  items,  including  inventions,  that  a  Centre  owns  or 
otherwise has control over at any time, should be considered jointly.  This is only 
possible  with  a  readily  available  and  regularly  updated  information  system  that 
includes invention disclosures and inventories of other valuable assets. 
Appropriate  information  on  portfolios  of  assets  and  needed  inputs  greatly 
facilitates  partner  selection  and  partnership  design.    Given  a  well-functioning 
information system, technologies of prospective partners can be identified as being 
complements to or substitutes for a Centre’s technologies.
As individual Centres are small players, their missions would benefit from 
pooled information systems and consideration of joint portfolios of assets and needed 
inputs.16
3. IP Strategy Challenges
The CG Centres’ IP challenges include issues on the input side as well as the 
output  side.    The  most  conspicuous  problems  involve  biotechnology  and  genetic 
resources.  However, important issues pertain to data, software, and human resources. 
The CG Centres’ IP challenges should be understood in the context of the 
Centres’ strengths and weaknesses.  These can be summarised as follows.
The strengths pertain to the System’s appeal to clients and donors as well as to 
prospective partners.  For prospective partners, the Centres’ guardianship of genetic 
resources as well as their high degree of connectivity with NARS are attractive.  They 
provide  links  to  field-testing  facilities  in  a  large  number  of  locations.    Many 
information streams converge on the Centres.  Centre scientists have an excellent 
reputation and are strongly committed to Centre missions. 
Weaknesses include the following.  Centres are small players in budgetary 
terms.  Their biotechnology investments, in particular, while significant, are dwarfed 
by  those  of  the  private  sector.    Centres  are  further  constrained  by  politics, 
stakeholders’ sometimes conflicting demands, and a consensus-based culture that may 
inhibit bold initiatives.  Centres face an increasing problem with restricted funding: 
donors insisting on specific uses for their contributions.  This reduces the Centres’  
flexibility (Binenbaum & Pardey 2003b),
The following subsections discuss some of the CG System’s major IP choices.17
3.1 Freedom-to-Operate Issues
Apparently, this is the set of issues that originally motivated the interest in IP 
in the CG System.  Consequently, this is what most of the relevant literature has 
focussed on so far.
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In 1998, a report was published (Cohen et al. 1999) that found that permission 
to use proprietary inputs in Centres was often either absent or unknown.  This report 
may have caused alarm about IP infringement through use of proprietary inputs in the 
Centres.  Thus, it was this issue that appeared to be the focus of IP concerns in the CG 
System.  However, most IPR relevant to developing-world farmers are valid only in 
developed countries.  Problems might arise in technologies destined for crops grown 
in developing countries unencumbered by IP restrictions, if those crops are exported 
to countries with strong IP.  However, as documented in Binenbaum et al. (2000, 
2003), South-North exports in important staple crops that are Centre mandate crops 
are generally dwarfed by production and consumption in the developing world, and 
these exports are concentrated in a few crops and a few exporting countries.  The CG 
Centres that focus on crop breeding are located in the developing world.  Thus, it 
would  seem  that  IPR  do  not  significantly  affect  the  freedom  to  operate  in  these 
Centres.  However, bundle thinking implies that this conclusion is incorrect.  If IP 
were separate from the other complements of technology bundles, you could access it 
unilaterally outside of its jurisdictions.  But this may not work since you might lack 
other components of the bundle – in particular genetic materials.
Access to materials was rated as relatively problematic among IP-related 
problems in a recent survey of the Centres.  In particular the provision of breeding 
materials by multinationals to Centres is highly problematic.  Materials provision by 
NARS and by advanced research institutes is also not without frictions (Binenbaum & 
Pardey 2002, Falcon 2001); for example, a manager at the International Potato Centre 
(CIP)  reports  that  “the  environment  specially  in  developing  countries  is  changing 
towards more defensive and protectionistic attitudes”; in view of this tendency, CIP is 
planning to review its formal IP policy (Marc Ghislain, pers.com.).
In summary, even when the materials are not subject to IP in the locations 
where they are used in R&D, and the varieties thus developed are not exported to the 
jurisdictions of the IPR that apply to the materials, then still the materials need to be 
                                                
13 A recommended reference is Nottenburg, Pardey & Wright (2002).18
obtained from their owners.  While it is not the IPR per se that limit Centres’ access to 
the materials in many cases, they will find themselves in a position as if they had to 
negotiate  for  permission  to  use  IP.    It  is  thus  unsurprising  that  rights  to  genetic 
materials  are  routinely  covered  in  discussions  of  (or  even,  not  quite  correctly, 
considered to be a subset of) IPR in the life sciences.
The recent survey (Binenbaum and Pardey 2002)  also showed that  critical 
R&D  inputs  for  the  Centres  include  process  technologies  like  the  gene  gun.    In 
process technologies, the codified information and human capital components of the 
technology bundles are important.  It may not be very useful for a Centre to try to 
reconstruct such technologies from the cryptic descriptions in patents.  In order to 
most effectively use such technologies, partnerships with the IP owners that include 
the supply of additional information and the exchange of scientific personnel may be 
required.  The Centre will find it helpful to secure its own IPR, or more generally, 
control  over  valuable  assets,  in  preparation  for  such  partnerships  (see  next 
subsection).
The relevance of the anticommons problem to the CGIAR’s work is vividly 
illustrated  with  the  example  of  “GoldenRice
R,”  a  type  of  rice  with  beta-carotene 
genetically engineered into it.   GoldenRice
R has the potential for a great nutritional 
and health impact.  About 70 pieces of IP, dispersed among a number of players, 
pertain to technologies embodied in GoldenRice
R.  All or most of these players must 
be persuaded to give permission to use their IP or related items for this project to 
proceed (Kryder, Kowalski & Krattiger 2000).  While these pieces of IP are for the 
most  part  not  valid  in  the  developing  world  (Binenbaum  et  al.  2000,  2003),  the 
owners simultaneously possess other elements of the relevant technology bundles.
Patents are the type of IPR, and rights to genetic materials the type of material 
property rights, that appear to be the greatest impediments to Centres’ freedom to 
operate.  This is because patentees have the right to exclude (or, more correctly, the 
right to sue to exclude) others from using the patented subjected matter in any way, 
including  research.    Other  types  of  IP  or  material  property  are  apparently  less 
problematic.  For example, copyrights are in one sense stronger than patents in that 
they are granted automatically, internationally (by treaty), and for a longer period, but 
they allow for “fair use” of the copyrighted materials.  Plant variety rights, a sui 
generis form of IPR specific to plants, are generally less restrictive than patents.  Most 
importantly, they allow for the use of protected varieties in breeding programs.  The 19
resultant varieties may themselves be protected through plant variety protection and 
are in no way subject to claims from the owners of progenitors (ancestral varieties).  
This  is  called  the  “breeders’  exemption”  or  “research  exemption”.    An  important 
exception to this rule occurs in countries whose plant variety rights follow the 1991 
version  of  the  International  Union  for  the  Protection  of  New  Varieties  of  Plants 
(UPOV).    Under  this  treaty,  plant  variety  rights  extend  to  “essentially  derived” 
varieties.  That is, you may not take protected variety A, insert a gene into it, and sell 
the resultant variety without the consent of A’s owner.  However, UPOV 1991 (the 
strongest version of plant variety protection) safeguards the use of protected varieties 
to obtain non-essentially-derived varieties, thus leaving the breeders’ exemption intact 
for the most part (Blakeney, Cohen & Crespi 1999).
Material property rights do not prevent any use of properties after they have 
been  transferred,  unless  explicit  legal  or  contractual  restrictions  apply.    Material 
transfer agreements (MTAs) may restrict use of transferred materials, but only the
signatories to MTAs are bound by them.  Restrictive MTAs are a major source of 
concern among Centre managers (Binenbaum & Pardey 2003b).
How to solve freedom-to-operate issues?  There is no simple solution.  The 
key lies in a relational approach and in an awareness of all available options (see 
above).  In devising a strategy for inter-organisational relations, it is important to 
differentiate between relevant categories of players.  While public-sector players may 
create obstacles to the Centres’ freedom to operate, on the whole it is the private 
sector,  and  in  particular  the  life  sciences  multinationals,  that  cause  the  greatest 
concern among Centre managers (Binenbaum & Pardey 2003b).  It is important to 
note this, because multinationals have made well-publicised donations of intellectual 
property and (hitherto) confidential information.  The reason for this may reside in 
multinationals  generally  behaving  in  ‘territorial’  ways,  but  an  alternative  or 
complementary explanation can be found in the Centres’ tradition of dealing with a 
multitude of nonprofit players – they are far less  experienced in dealing with the 
private sector.  Let us, then, pay a bit of special attention to the Centres’ relations with 
the private sector.20
3.2 Relations with the Private Sector
14
What kinds of relations are appropriate between CG Centres and the private 
sector?  What are the strategic IP implications of the answer to this question?
Centre managers are understandably circumspect in their relations with the 
private sector.  Adversarial (e.g. competitive) relations are not a specialty of the CG 
tradition, while cooperative relations with the private sector are often looked at with 
suspicion  by  some  of  the  System’s  traditional  stakeholders.    A  cooperative 
relationship  (e.g.  exchange,  gift,  or  R&D  collaboration)  is  generally  intended  to 
benefit  both  sides.    Thus  sponsors  might  ask  whether  their  contributions  to  CG 
Centres that cooperate with, say, multinationals, are subsidising the latter.  Even more 
problematic may be the attitudes of providers of genetic resources, e.g., “Why should 
we be providing germplasm for free, if this multinational is (albeit indirectly) making 
a profit out of it?”  Relations with multinationals thus require discretion and subtlety.
However, an active policy involving many types of relations with the private 
sector is appropriate given the Centres’ missions, and IP strategy must be carefully 
designed to enable this.  In their interactions with the private sector, Centres will 
likely discriminate between different types of firms, especially between firms based in 
developing countries and those based in rich countries, because helping the former 
may be consistent with their missions.  However, in doing so, they need to consider 
the possibilities of takeovers of local firms by multinationals.
15
Incoming transfers.  Transfers of IPR as well as the other components of 
technology  bundles  from  firms  to  Centres  are  important  to  the  Centres.    Often, 
licensing or acquiring a bundle element from the owner is the only or best way to 
obtain the desired technology.  The item may be sold or licensed at a commercial fee, 
but often will be transferred at a lower or zero price.  Firms may have a variety of 
reasons to do so (Binenbaum & Pardey 2003b).  Many of these considerations can be 
summarised as “maintaining long-term relationships with the Centres” and relate to 
the Centres’ strengths listed above.
Transfers are often most effectively organised as a part of partnerships that 
encompass other relation types, such as R&D collaboration, as well
                                                
14 This section is partly based on Binenbaum & Pardey (2003b).
15 This theme surfaced in two  case studies, Binenbaum, Pardey & Wright (2002) and Binenbaum, 
Pardey & Sanint (2002).21
Competitive  and  adversarial  relations.    The  System’s  technology 
positioning  in  crops  that  are  important  in  domestic  consumer  markets  in  the 
developing  world  may  imply  partly  competitive  relations  with  the  private  sector.  
However, this may not be a bad thing in terms of the Centres’ missions.  The System 
might  benefit  poor  farmers  and  consumers  in  developing  countries  not  only  by 
producing public goods but also by countering market power.  Conventionally bred 
Centre varieties may be imperfect substitutes for more expensive transgenic varieties, 
thus forcing multinationals to reduce the latter’s prices and benefiting farmers.
The potential for Centres to produce or encourage the production of competing 
technologies  and  products  may  encourage  multinationals  to  cooperate  with  the 
Centres to reduce this threat.  This  is  also connected to  the  problem  of  proprietary 
inputs.  Suppose that Centres face an uncooperative owner of a proprietary input.  
Suppose that an advanced research institute has the capacity to invent around it.  The 
Centres and donors might encourage the ARI to do this and supply the alternative 
input to the Centres.  The alternative input would compete with the original one and 
reduce its value.  This need not actually happen: this prospect might deter the input’s 
owner from non-cooperation.
While Centres are naturally reluctant to antagonise other players, they may in 
exceptional cases decide to take active steps in IP conflicts.  CIAT initiated litigation 
in the United States in what it considers to be a case of biopiracy by a U.S. firm.  The 
firm had claimed IP for what CIAT considers to be one of its in-trust crop varieties 
(Binenbaum & Pardey 2003b).  In another case, a recipient Australian organisation of 
in-trust germplasm applied for plant variety protection, in violation of the relevant 
material transfer agreement.  A few aggressive steps by the responsible Centre, short 
of formal legal action, were sufficient to make the recipient withdraw its application 
(Bragdon 2000:81).  A small number of actions of this kind may suffice to signal to 
partners and other players that Centres are prepared to act aggressively in defence of 
their missions if necessary.  They may thus play an indirect role in an appropriate 
“sticks and carrots” or “Tit for Tat” (see above) approach.
R&D Collaboration.  Following the logic of bundle thinking, it often does 
not make sense to try to get IPR transfers alone.  The IPR may not be useful in the 
absence  of  other  elements  of  the  bundle.    It  takes  time  to  develop  trust  and 
coordination  to  accommodate  transfers  of  all  elements  of  technology bundles.    A 22
partnership  involving  R&D  collaboration  is  sometimes  the  optimal  setting  to 
accomplish this.
Outgoing  Transfers.    Technology  transfer  to  developing  countries  is 
sometimes  hampered  by  lack  of  capacity  for  downstream  development  and 
distribution in NARS partners.  In such cases, the private sector might perform the 
latter  roles,  and  intellectual  property  may  play  a  role  in  this.    For  example,  the 
International  Centre  for  Tropical  Agriculture  (CIAT),  a  Centre,  has  entered  a 
partnership with Papalotla, a private Mexican seed firm.  Seeds of tropical forages for 
cattle  farming,  developed  by  CIAT,  are  expensive  to  multiply and  distribute,  and 
NARS  lack  the  necessary  facilities  for  this.    Papalotla  does  have  such  facilities.  
According to the agreement, Papalotla helps fund the necessary R&D, registers CIAT 
as plant variety owner in countries where it plans to sell the seeds, and licenses the 
rights to sell the seeds from CIAT.  The IP protection provides assurance to Papalotla 
that competitors won’t free-ride on its investments in this project.  The IP protection 
also  helps  Papalotla  to  engage in  long-term  relationships  with  its  customers, thus 
allowing it to follow up its seed sales with extension activities.  Farmers can thus be 
properly  informed  so  that  they  can  realise  the  potential  of  the  new  technology 
(Binenbaum, Pardey & Wright 2002).
Catalysis and Coordination.  The Centres’ uniquely connective position in 
the global agricultural R&D system enables them to initiate arrangements, even ones 
in which they themselves are not directly involved.  They may strengthen or even help 
emerge a local private sector.  The Papalotla arrangement helps Papalotla grow, and it 
has begun engaging in R&D itself, in collaboration with CIAT.  The International 
Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), another Centre, has also assumed a catalytic 
role.    It helped  to  get the  private  seed  sector  started  in  West  and  Central  Africa 
(Binenbaum & Pardey 2003b).
3.3  Secrecy versus Openness Issues
As information and IP are closely related elements of technology bundles, the 
question of confidentiality versus openness is closely related to IP strategy.
16
                                                
16 For example, CIMMYT IP policy IV.4 states: “On occasion, CIMMYT may enter into contracts that 
provide  for the acquisition  and management of confidential  materials. CIMMYT may also seek to 
protect the products of its research by obtaining intellectual property protection through patents, plant 
breeders’ rights, copyrights, trademarks, statutory invention registrations or their equivalent, and/or 
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With  respect  to  public-sector  research  organizations  that  are  mandated  to 
promote the public good, commentators tend to voice an ideal of perfect transparency.  
For example, “One of the missions of public universities, especially the land-grant 
colleges and universities, is to generate knowledge, technologies, and products that 
promote the ‘public good’.  Pursuing this mission demands that universities practice 
‘open science’, which means that scientists completely disclose all new discoveries to 
the scientific community” (Maredia et al. 1999:247, quoting Argyres & Liebeskind 
1998).
In  practice,  however,  there  are  circumstances  that  justify  less-than-perfect 
transparency.    A  number  of  problems  might  be  associated  with  immediate  and 
complete  disclosure  of  research results.    First,  disclosure  may hamper  subsequent 
intellectual property claims, which in turn may be justifiable on a number of grounds.  
Second, the disclosed information might be used by third parties in ways inimical to 
the disclosing organization’s mission.   Third, liability  concerns could play a role.  
Fourth,  partner  organizations,  in  particular  for-profit  ones,  may  insist  on  partial 
confidentiality as a condition for collaboration.
In addition, Centres might occasionally want to withhold information from the 
public domain to use as a bargaining chip.  Secrecy can be entirely informal, but in 
some jurisdictions – under certain conditions – it is protected by trade secret law.  
Clearly, this type of bargaining chip would be controversial, and I do not know of any 
Centre  use  of  it.    There  is,  however,  one  interesting  case  of  a  collaboration  (the 
Biological  Control  of  Locusts  project;  French  acronym:  LUBILOSA)  in  which  a 
Centre  (IITA)  is  involved,  where  one  partner  (CAB  International)  did  withhold 
information for this purpose:  “The LUBILOSA programme has maintained a policy 
of  public  disclosure  of  information,  results  and  outputs  generated  throughout  the 
course of its research and development…  The only minor exception to the general 
policy of complete freedom of information occurred in relation to the technical details 
of  the  more  sophisticated  oil  miscible  (OF)  formulation  and  a  limited  amount  of 
information  relating  to  spore  storage  models.    LUBILOSA  has  made  public  an 
estimated 99.5% of the information generated through its research…  The remaining 
small amount of work that is not in the public domain relates to a highly sophisticated 
formulation, that has not been as extensively tested…  The OF formulation could not 
                                                                                                                                           
dated August 2001, was in force as of, and downloaded, January 8, 2003.  The point is that this quote 
puts confidentiality and IP together in consecutive sentences.24
be produced by an artisanal approach because its manufacture requires the use of 
costly  specialist  machinery.    Maintaining  confidence  about  the  technical 
specifications of the OF formulation does not preclude exploitation of the [simple but 
robust]  SU  formulation  of  the  mycoinsecticide  by  non-commercial  producers  and 
artisanal producers in developing countries.  CABI Bioscience has maintained [the 
confidential know-how] as industrial secrets on behalf of LUBILOSA in agreement 
with its partners” (Dent 2000, pp.8-9).  For more on the LUBILOSA project, see 
Binenbaum & Pardey (2003b).
The  Centres’  reliance  on  reputation  in  securing  the  cooperation  of  many 
players does not allow for an extensive use of secrets as bargaining chips.  As in the 
LUBILOSA  case,  this  strategy  should  be  restricted  to  rare  cases  where  the 
information has high strategic value for a prospective partnership, but low value for 
the Centres’ clients.  The situation for information transferred or generated within a 
collaboration with a private-sector partner is very different: here, confidentiality may 
be a necessary condition for the partnership.  Confidentiality is one of the costs of 
getting closer to the private sector.
However,  this  does  not  imply  that  it  is  optimal  for  the  Centres  to 
unconditionally share their information in most cases.  In fact, it would be misleading 
to  entirely  reduce  disclosure  strategy  to  a  simple  secrecy/openness  dichotomy.  
Information can be shared immediately subject to conditions.  Practically anyone who 
wishes to use information supplied by Centres or other units connected to the CG 
System can be made to agree to certain conditions.  Such conditions can include the 
supply of a wide range of data.  Technological data are an important subset of the 
potentially  valuable  data  that  could  be  collected  in  this  way.    Various  kinds  of 
organisations  can  be  made  to  supply  information  about  themselves  and  their 
partnerships as a condition for tapping into the CG System’s databases.  It appears 
that the potential for this kind of data collection has not yet been fully tapped.  The 
CG System does traditionally have a system whereby recipients of breeding products 
oblige themselves contractually to supply technical  data relating to the  use of the 
products, e.g. in their own breeding programs (Binenbaum, Pardey & Wright 2001; 
Binenbaum & Pardey 2003b).
The publication of information can serve as a tool to keep third parties from 
claiming  IP  related  to  the  information.    Publication  may  create  “prior  art”,  thus 
destroying the potential novelty of an invention and rendering it non-patentable.  But 25
if you decide to publish patentable information, you better be sure that you don’t want 
to seek a patent yourself, because prior art precludes patenting even if the author of 
the prior art is the same person as the patent applicant (Adams & Henson-Apollonio 
2002).  Falcon (2001) points to another risk of defensive publishing: that it may not 
cover all of the patentable information and that it in fact may provide clues that may 
enable others to patent, using “surrounding” information.
3.4 IP protection by Centres versus No IP Protection by Centres
Many kinds of products of Centre activity may be subject to IP protection.  
These  include,  for  example,  publications  (which  are  automatically  subject  to 
worldwide  copyrights),  plant  varieties,  animal  vaccines,  pest  control  methods, 
enabling  technologies  that  are  useful  in  laboratories  and  genebanks,  genomic 
information, software, all sorts of field data that Centres collect, data on organisations 
and inter-organisational partnerships, and Centre names and logos.  Each of these 
categories can be matched with one or more types of IPR.
17
The  System’s  technology  positioning  choices  have  yielded  an  interesting 
potential IP portfolio.  Due to the aforementioned extensions of the System’s research 
agenda  that  have  not  been  matched  by  commensurate  funding  increases,  there  is 
certainly a danger of over-stretching and fragmentation of R&D resources.  However, 
this  broad  portfolio  also  creates  opportunities.    Activities  in  natural  resource 
management  and  genomics,  together  with  the  more  traditional  breeding  activities, 
may  eventually  yield  powerfully  integrated  geo-biological  information  systems 
managed  by  Centres  and  System-wide  services.    In  addition,  the  System’s  and 
Centres’  uniquely  centrality  in  worldwide  inter-organisational  interactions  could 
enable them to become foci of collection of information on organisations and their 
relationships.  The System could be a source of information on ”Who is working on 
Which Technology With Whom, In Competition with Whom, How (i.e., institutional 
and contractual arrangements), and with What Results?” As argued above, public and 
immediate  access  to  such  information  systems  may  well  be  for  the  most  part  in 
accordance with Centers’ missions, but needs to be made subject to conditions.  And 
IP protection could make a big difference in enforcing such conditions.  Thus, IP 
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protection can actually be employed in the service of maintaining and furthering the 
open exchange of knowledge (Longhorn, Henson-Apollonion & White 2002).
IP  protection  must  be  considered  in  conjunction  with  alternative  and 
complementary tactics, such as publishing (in the case of defensive purposes) and the 
use of contractual arrangements that may help protect other elements of technology 
bundles.    Confidentiality  agreements  may  be  used  to  protect  human  knowledge; 
information transfer agreements, to protect codified information; and material transfer 
agreements (MTAs), to protect materials, in particular genetic resources.  However, 
such contractual arrangements may be relatively weak forms of protection, as only the 
signatories to contracts are bound by them.
Consider  the  following  list  of  pros  and  cons  of  IP  protection,  or,  more 
specifically, patent protection.  Most of the cost and benefit items listed are in fact 
effects on game-like and/or political inter-organisational interactions.
Costs  of  Seeking  IP  Protection.    Falcon  (2001:55)  rightly  points  out: 
“Clearly, not all research findings need to be protected; indeed, as a practical matter, 
very few of them do.”
Costs or risks involved in IP protection include: (1) an often substantial direct 
IP protection cost;  (2)  “… a concern that the capability to obtain intellectual property 
rights might skew the research agenda of the centres”; and  (3) objections of some CG 
stakeholders who “view proprietary science arising from public money, or applied to 
living material, as being inconsistent with the CGIAR mission, or even unethical” 
(CGIAR 1998, p.7).
Clarification  of  Rights.    IPR  serve  a  clarifying  role  and  may  reduce 
transaction costs.  This argument is rare as an independent motive, but may play a role 
in conjunction with any of the other motives.
The Defensive Motive.  The public sector might on occasion take out a patent 
in order to prevent for-profits from appropriating the technology.  If this is the prime 
motive  for  potential  IP  protection,  other  methods  of  keeping  technologies  in  the 
public domain such as publication (see above) need to be considered.  However, a 
Centre’s  patent  application  in  a  developing  country,  perhaps  the  location  of  its 
headquarters,  might  be  a  low-cost  method  for  preventing  appropriation  by others.  27
This has been confirmed to be the primary motive for one Centre for submitting a 
patent application.
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The  Revenue  Motive.    Given  widespread  misgivings  among  stakeholders, 
direct revenues are unlikely to be a major motive for Centre patenting in the near 
future.  The controversial nature of the revenue motive was reflected in disagreement 
among  members  of  an  advisory  panel  on  IP:  “For  most  of  the  Panel,  generating 
income will never be the main reason for seeking protection.  This must be clear, or it 
will be a constant temptation to divert the energies of the Centres away from their 
mission.  Only a few developments generate income—and it is not easy to predict 
which—but all cost money to protect.  This does not mean that if money is offered, it 
must be refused.
A minority of the Panel believes strongly that significant developments of the 
Centres should be protected if they offer good prospects of financial reward.  The 
money generated should be used for the mission, and for remunerating sources of 
germplasm  (there  are  many  possibilities,  including  paying  farmers  who  preserve 
biodiversity,  royalties  to  communities  of  origin,  supporting  research  into  in  situ
conservation benefiting the poor, etc.).  Not to protect such developments is to waste 
useful resources” (CGIAR 1998, p.8).
The United States’ experience after the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 has been that
royalties from most university inventions are modest, with a few notable exceptions; 
for  a  few  universities,  royalty income  constitutes  a  significant,  though  not  major, 
contribution to research budgets.  The International Centre for International Centre for 
Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) is an interesting contrast to the CG 
System.  It  is  somewhat  comparable  to  the  CGIAR  as  an  international  R&D 
organisation, but has no qualms about licensing revenues, of which it receives more 
than $1 million annually.
While direct revenues may not an important motive for IP protection in the 
Centres, indirect revenues may be more relevant.  For example, CIAT was able to free 
resources for other areas of research by initiating a consortium for rice research, the 
Latin American Fund for Irrigated Rice (FLAR).  FLAR is  supported by private- and 
public-sector organisations connected to rice in Latin America.  IP protection plays an 
important role in reassuring FLAR members that third parties won’t free ride on their 
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financial and germplasm contributions (Binenbaum, Pardey & Sanint 2002).  IP can 
be  an  important  partnership  asset  in  agreements  that  also  involve  financial 
contributions.    For  example,  the  International  Wheat  and  Maize  Centre’s 
(CIMMYT’s) patent related to apomixis (asexual reproduction of plants) played an 
important role in its R&D partnership with several private firms active in the seed 
business.  Part of this partnership is substantial financial support by the firms.  It 
appears that, when embedded in such a larger partnership, the use of IP to help obtain 
private-sector  funding  becomes  more  acceptable  to  stakeholders.    A  plausible 
motivation for the firms to enter this partnership and contribute funds may be that 
apomixis may undermine markets for hybrid seeds.  Hybrid varieties that reproduce 
sexually lose their vigour in successive generations; their seeds must therefore be re-
purchased.  If apomixis is engineered into hybrid varieties, successive generations 
will be genetically identical and seeds may only need to be purchased once.  The 
firms’ interest in this partnership may have been motivated by the desire to partly 
control a technology that has could potentially transform their business strategy.
Technology  Transfer  and  Development  Incentives.    IPR  “can  facilitate 
technology transfer when a private partner is needed to accomplish this goal” (CGIAR 
1998, p.8).  This may be the case in important areas like vaccine development and 
plant variety development (CGIAR 1998, p.13).  An example is the CIAT-Papalotla 
agreement mentioned above.
According to a related argument IP “can be used to attract local investments, 
as  well  as  to  facilitate  capital  formation  in  the  countries  where  the  Centres  are 
located” (CGIAR 1998, p.8).
The “Bargaining Chip” Motive.  When Centres possess IP of interest to the 
for-profit sector, they might obtain, in return for licenses and other forms of use rights 
to  the  IP:  (1)  use  rights  to  others’  IP  and  materials  (“cross-licensing”);  (2)  other 
desirable assets; (3) these and/or other favorable conditions in R&D partnerships; or 
(4)  desirable  behaviors,  for  example  in  for-profits’  dealings  with  developing 
countries.  In fact, the term “bargaining chip”, though widely used, is a bit awkward:  
Bargaining occurs often, but not always, in the relevant relationships.  A better term 
would be “partnership assets”.
Whatever it is that Centres obtain in return for IP use rights, segmentation will 
often be a key element of the deal.  That is, the contract will differentiate between 29
different  uses  or  destinations  of  the  technology.      Low  or  zero  royalties  may  be 
obtained if for uses by subsistence farmers or in subsequent nonprofit research.
Sentiments  among  the  CGIAR  System’s  stakeholders  appear  to  be  largely 
favorable  towards  this  motive.    For  example,  in  an  electronic  conference  on  the 
CGIAR  System’s  future,  “The  notion  of  the  CGIAR’s  germplasm  collection  as 
‘bargaining chips’ came up often: the CGIAR should strive to negotiate joint ventures 
with the private sector, to stimulate it to contribute to the needs of poor farmers and 
marginal regions.  They argued that such a policy would be in the spirit of the CGIAR 
as an international public goods institution.  It was recognised that some exceptions 
may  be  necessary  to  offer  exclusive  licenses  to  ensure  the  full  development  and 
delivery of some technologies (e.g. animal vaccines)” (CGIAR 2000a:3).  Note that 
the CGIAR System’s germplasm collections are mostly not suitable for primary IP 
protection, but the bargaining chip motive applies to both materials and IP.
A  special  issue  involves  R&D  products  that  are  essentially  derived  from 
CGIAR properties or in-trust materials:  “In some cases, ownership could be used to 
obtain access to technologies and/or materials developed and protected by others, but 
essentially derived from CGIAR properties (e.g., the addition of a single gene to a 
CGIAR-developed plant variety)” (CGIAR 1998:8).
The Signaling Motive.  By obtaining a patent, a Centre may demonstrate its 
innovative capability and enhance its reputation.  This alone might make the Centre a 
more attractive partner, quite apart from the value of the patent to the prospective 
partners.
Undesirable Actions by Others and Liability. The control of a technology 
(or other type of information) afforded by a patent (or other type of IP) may enable a 
Centre to prevent others from using the technology (information) for purposes the 
Centre does not approve of or from actions that raise liability concerns.  For example, 
trademarks (covering Centre names and/or logos) are used for this purpose by some 
Centres.    Trademark  protection  may  help  prevent  problems  like  unauthorised 
statements made in name of a Centre (Binenbaum & Pardey 2003a).
3.5 Exclusivity versus Non-Exclusivity in Partnerships with IP Aspects
An issue that must often be faced in partnerships is that of exclusivity versus 
non-exclusivity.  Disadvantages of exclusivity include the concentration of risk and 
possible  negative  effects  on  relations  with  the  partners’  competitors.  However, 30
exclusive licensing to a single firm or a group of firms may often be necessary to get 
the firms on board in a partnership, as it is a source of competitive advantage to them.  
In most partnerships involving Centres, private sector, and IP, there is some form of 
exclusivity.    This  is  true  for  several  examples  cited  above:  the  CIAT-Papalotla 
partnership, the CIMMYT apomixis partnership, and the FLAR arrangement.  In the 
case of FLAR, the exclusivity is fairly mild: there is only one member organisation in
the consortium per country, which obtains the exclusive rights to FLAR varieties in 
that country; but each member organisation is itself composed of a group of firms 
and/or other players, and is intended to be representative of the country’s rice sector 
(Binenbaum, Pardey & Sanint 2002).
3.6 The Extent of Standardisation of IP policy at the Centre and System Levels 
Many aspects  of  IP  policy  lend  themselves  well  for  standardisation  across 
interactions of a single Centre or even among all Centres.  For example, Centres 
employ  standard  MTAs,  including  a  System-wide  standard  MTA  for  in-trust 
materials.  Although the Centres are independent organisations, they largely have the 
same  missions  and  face  the  same  pressures.    They  study  each  other’s  IP  policy 
statements, MTAs, etc., so  that a time-ordered sequence of  IP policies statements 
from different Centres may reflect a series of adaptations and improvements (Aart van 
Schoonhoven, pers. com.) as well as strategic differences.
Standardisation is also often appropriate for IP-related rules involving access 
to the databases of the Centres and System-wide units.
However, partnership choices and specific institutional IP arrangements do not 
lend themselves for standardisation.
3.7  The  Proper  Level  of  Investment  in  IP  Expertise,  Strategy  Formulation  and 
Supporting Information Systems
The benefits of investment in IP expertise, strategy formulation, specific IP 
choices, and supporting information systems, are extremely difficult to quantify.  This 
is  especially  due  to  the  relational  nature  of  IP  matters.    The  impacts  of  an 
improvement  in  IP  strategy  resources  on  the  totality  of  relevant  game-like 
interactions, and via these the impacts on mission-related indicators, would have to be 
anticipated  –  a  close-to-impossible  task.    However,  managers  may  improve  their 31
intuitive  sense  of  the  prospective  value  of  such  investments  by  familiarising 
themselves with the principles put forth in this paper.
Most Centres have by now invested in IP management.  Some have created IP 
management positions, others have allocated significant time of existing managers to 
IP  management,  and  some  pro  bono  IP  services  are available  from  professionals.  
CAS-IP serves as a System-wide counterpart to these, helps to raise awareness in the 
System on IP issues, provides IP-related information that is of System-wide use, and 
provides a liaison so that Centre IP managers can learn from each other’s experiences.  
In practice, it is difficult for one person plus some administrative support – the current 
size of CAS-IP – to do all this.  
The quality and impact of IP strategy depends in a large measure on the scope 
and depth of supporting information systems.
Relational  thinking  makes  a  big  difference  to  a  proper  assessment  of  the 
benefits of information systems.  While there is a substantial awareness in the System 
concerning the importance of extensive technological information systems (including, 
to some extent, patent databases and the like) the same cannot be said of strategic 
information  of  the  kind  “Who  is  doing  What  with  Whom,  In  Competition  with 
Whom,  How  and  with  What  Results?”    There  is  a  wide  variety  of  institutional 
arrangements  and  scope  for  improvements  in  them.    The  problems,  risks,  and 
opportunities inherent in partnerships are manifold, and managers should be able to 
learn from accumulated worldwide experiences.  They should have ready access to 
track records of prospective partners in their prior partnerships.  They should have 
available  data  that  allow  estimation  of  the  value  of  their  organisations’  assets  to 
prospective  partners.    This  requires  both  readily  available  market  analyses  (even 
though  the  managers  themselves  may  not  be  commercial  players)  and  internal 
laboratory  notes  and  invention  disclosure  systems.    Information  on  competitive 
relationships Large and rich information systems should be extremely user-friendly –
in  this  way  a  small  number  of  managers  and  advisors  can  effectively  access 
astronomical amounts of data through rapid filtering procedures.  User-friendliness of 
information systems requires relatively large investments.
Portfolio  thinking  implies  that  managers  should  have  access  to  pooled 
information from the System and beyond.  This would enable them, for example, to 
rapidly identify another Centre that could contribute an invention or other assets to a 
prospective public-private partnership.32
Some  game-theoretic  awareness  goes  a  long  way  towards  appreciating  the 
value of fine-tuned incentive provision in institutional arrangements and the value of 
possessing information indicative of partners’ valuations of one’s assets.
Two  further  connections  between  IP  strategy  and  information  systems  are 
worthy of mention.  First, IP categories allow for useful taxonomies of technological 
information systems.  For example, a patent can be viewed as a unit of technology.  
Thus, patent searches that may initially be intended to avoid trouble with proprietary 
inputs, may simultaneously serve to alert managers to technological opportunities to 
further the Centres’ missions.  The discipline and organisational routines required to 
conduct a minimally responsible and defensive IP policy might simultaneously enable 
more  proactive  and  entrepreneurially-minded  IP  approaches.    Second,  IP 
managers/advisors and ICT managers/advisors should spend time to coordinate their 
strategies/advice.    This  working  time  should  be  taken  into  account  in  budget 
allocations.
To a certain extent, the proper design of information-sharing mechanisms can 
substitute for explicitly budgeted investments in information systems.  In-kind support 
from  Centres  can  be  elicited  for  system-wide  information  systems  if  the  Centres 
anticipate,  in  return,  a  commensurate  improvement  in  information  provision.  
Nonetheless, in light of the foregoing considerations, the expected allocation of only 
US$300,000  annually  to  the  System-wide  Chief  Information  Officer’s  unit  seems 
positively paltry in relation to the CGIAR combined annual budget – on the order of 
one-tenth of a percent.  Two effects of investment in information provision (as well as
CAS-IP) can be distinguished: the impact on the productivity of a given budget, and 
the expected boost to the budget.  If all other CGIAR activities were to sacrifice 
another one-tenth of a percent to double the CIO’s budget, that would likely boost the 
effectiveness  of  those  activities  (in  terms  of  indicators  of  mission  fulfilment  and 
managers’  valuations  of  those  indicators)  by  a  multiple  of  that  percentage.      In 
addition,  the  improved  information  provision  would  probably  allow  Centres  to 
increase their budgets – again, by a multiple (in terms of net present value) of the 
investment.  Remember that funds can be raised in the context of partnerships.
In summary, it is likely that a budget increase for both CAS-IP and the CIO 
would  make  sense  from  a  mission  optimisation  perspective.    Unfortunately,  such 
intuitions are practically impossible to back up with numbers – what is really required 33
is a proper understanding of what is at stake among managers and donors of the CG 
System.
3.8 Overall Strategy and Higher-level Initiatives
Policymakers  at  any  level  (donor,  other  stakeholder,  System,  Centre)  can 
initiate institutional innovations that may help the System’s IP strategies.  There may 
be some unexploited scope for IP clearinghouse mechanisms (Graff et al. 2001; Graff 
& Zilberman 2001).  Many institutions  and persons  (including some employed in 
multinationals) share the values embodied in the Centres’ missions.  Combined with 
the System’s network connectivity and its reputation for scientific excellence, this
might enable the continuation of an innovation system - that of the CG System and its 
nonprofit partner institutions – that is, to date, for the most part non-proprietary.  The 
viability, efficiency, and scope of such an innovation system are illustrated by Open 
Source approaches in software development, such as Linux (Lerner & Tirole 2000, 
2002).  Critical to such a system is the existence of a small set of leaders that are 
respected in the R&D community (Tuomi 2003).  This is the sociological status that
Centres need to have in order to be or become foci of information flows.  
The Centres may overcome their limitations as small players in biotech and 
enhance their freedom to operate by finding allies in the public and private nonprofit 
sectors.  To do so, a rich and user-friendly supply of relevant information on these 
players is indispensable.  Consider one (sub)type of solution to the proprietary-input 
problem.  Manager M at Centre C needs input I from private player P.  P is unwilling 
to  share  I.    M  searches  her  information  system  and  finds  an  advanced  research 
institute (A) that might be able to invent around I.  After some initial contacts it is 
apparent that A is indeed capable of developing the alternative I’ to I, but the funding 
isn’t available.  M again searches her information system, this time concerning the 
prospective commercial value of I.  After all, if I is an important enabling technology, 
then would I’ not be able to capture some of the value of I?  The information search 
reveals the potential of I’ to do so its applicability for additional purposes not served 
by  I.    C’s  sponsors  as  well  as  venture  capitalists  who  might  be  interested  in  a 
commercial spinoff from A are approached for funding.  Some respond positively.  
Meanwhile, some information concerning these activities is transmitted to P.  Now, P 
is willing to share I with C, while joining a partnership with A to develop I’ that will 
give it some control of I’.34
This example is just one among an endless amount of permutations in patterns 
that may be followed to operate successfully in the era of advanced ICT, advanced 
biotech, and widespread IPR.  It illustrates relational thinking (including game-like 
features) as well as the critical role of information systems in finding institutional 
solutions to IP problems.
The example of FLAR and a few similar commodity-based consortia shows 
that there is potential to find private-sector funding from developing countries in the 
type  of  crops  that  dominate  the  CG’s  research  agenda,  namely  crops  with  large 
domestic markets but without large exports to rich countries.  Thus, someone in or 
around the CG System should examine the relevant markets to see if consortia can be 
arranged that tap into this source of funding.
Some Centres have developed a culture conducive to such initiatives.  Other 
Centres appear to be more cautious.  While Centre missions and sponsors are similar, 
these  differences  and  differences  in  mandates  guarantee  that  a  large  diversity  of 
institutional  experiments  are  undertaken.    Some  of  these  experiments  are  more 
defensive and less risky, aimed at avoiding IP trouble; others involve substantial risk, 
for example exclusivity in licensing.  The diversity in Centre policies may lead to 
differences in Centre growth, as sponsors and other funders will observe success or 
failure.
If the Centres succeed in becoming global foci of relevant information as well 
as germplasm and research products, this might suffice to ensure continued supplies 
of germplasm to their genebanks.  Countries – that is, their NARS – could be made to 
be forthcoming in their supply of genetic resources if they perceive to receive great 
benefits from the Centres in return.  Such incentives would be especially powerful if 
(by some new international agreement) Centre genebanks (or some other responsible 
body) would have the authority to withhold information, germplasm, and/or research 
products in response to especially blatant non-cooperation from a NARS.  With strong 
enough Centres, such a threat would probably very rarely, if ever, have to be carried 
out.  This is another possible mechanism through which increased investment in the 
CGIAR  could  contribute  to  agro-biodiversity  conservation  for  the  benefit  of 
humankind and its future generations.35
5. Concluding Comments
I hope to have persuaded the reader that the CG System, as other nonprofit and 
for-profit organisations active in the life sciences, needs to undergo a management 
revolution in response to the biotech, ICT, and IP revolutions.  This management 
revolution is necessary to maintain and enhance the Centres’ freedom to operate, to 
boost their stagnant budgets, and to make each dollar invested in the System more 
productive in meeting the System’s objectives.  The requisite management revolution 
consists of applying the principles of systemic thinking, relational thinking, bundle 
thinking, and portfolio thinking, and of providing sufficient investment in IP expertise 
and especially in ICT expertise and user-friendly systems that supply information on a 
far wider range of variables than is commonly considered necessary for nonprofit 
R&D management
The  principles  outlined  in  this  paper  imply  that  IP  strategy  is  useful  in  a 
number of ways, the most salient of which are the following.  First, the System needs 
exchange assets and partnership assets to access and leverage other organisations’ 
technologies, IPR, money, people, etc.  The System has the potential to create such 
exchange/partnership  assets  because  of  its  strengths  of  network  centrality  –
connecting  it  to  NARS  in  particular  –  germplasm  collections,  and  scientific 
reputation.  Exchange/partnership assets may include inter alia data – including for 
example  genomic,  geo-biological,  and  relational  data  –,  software,  enabling 
technologies, plant varieties, pest control methods, and animal vaccines.  IP strategy 
can  be  used  to  convert  potential  strengths  into  exchange/partnership  assets.    For 
example,  data  may  be  made  readily  available  to  the  public  but  subject  to  certain 
conditions such as the provision of other data in return.  Second, bundle thinking 
implies that access to IP may be problematic even for use in jurisdictions where the IP 
is not valid.  The IP owner will likely own elements of technology bundles other than 
IPR.  Thus, the IP owner will often need to de dealt with as if the IP were valid in the 
relevant jurisdiction.  Third, IP protection may play a role in technology transfer to 
developing countries, in the process contribution to the viability of the local private 
sector.  Fourth, while the Centres are more constrained in certain respects – e.g. in 
obtaining IP protection, or in obtaining funding in return for valuable assets – than 
other players are, they need IP strategy to find solutions that involve other players –
for  example,  IP  ownership  by  allies,  or  partnerships  that  include  funding 36
arrangements but make such arrangements more acceptable to stakeholders.  Thus, 
such  constraints  imply  that  a  greater,  not  a  lesser,  awareness  of  IP  strategy  is 
necessary in the System.  Fifth, transaction costs are a major issue for the Centres.  
According to our recent survey of the Centres (Binenbaum and Pardey 2002), access 
to IP, information and materials is generally possible and licensing fees – if Centres 
have to pay them at all – are generally affordable.  The main problem in accessing 
technology is costly and time-consuming negotiations.  This problem is exacerbated if 
some negotiators are not sufficiently familiar with IP.  Some negotiations and similar 
hassles are probably inevitable in partnerships; however, such transaction costs are 
often minimized by clearly delineating current and future IP ownership – or at least 
procedures that will determine future IP ownership – at an early stage.  Sixth, as the 
FLAR example shows, IP strategy can be employed to design consortia and other 
partnerships that tap supplementary funding sources.   Seventh,  IP  ownership  may 
allow Centres control of uses of technology so that these are in accordance of Centre 
missions.  Eighth and finally, IP strategy can be employed to help the System play a 
leading role in the continuation of the innovation system that consists of the System 
and its nonprofit partners – a system characterised by a minimal use of proprietary 
mechanisms  and  a  maximum  degree  of  openness  and  unimpeded  flows  of
information, genetic resources, technologies, and human capital.
For  economists,  the  message  is  complex  yet  in  essence  simple:  Systemic 
thinking is worthwhile for understanding innovation strategy.  Theoretical modelling 
(e.g.  to  contribute  to  institutional  solutions  to  incentive  problems)  and  empirical 
hypothesis  testing  certainly  have  their  place,  but  these  parsimonious  approaches 
should be embedded in taxonomic and systemic structures of concepts, assumptions, 
and real-world phenomena.    Remarkably, individual choices can only be understood 
at the systemic level.  In the traditional analysis of competitive markets, you can work 
with an actor who responds to a price and otherwise does not take systemic features 
into account.  This picture is somewhat complicated, though mostly still intact, in 
textbook analyses of market power.  But in the individual choices that matter to the 
topic  at  hand,  such  as  the  set  of  options  to  deal  with  the  need  for  a  proprietary 
technology, the system is fully present in all its complexity.  Embracing parsimony as 
the only valid methodology would destroy our understanding of this situation.
If they pay sufficient attention to both systemic features – e.g. relation types –
and insights from the other social sciences – such as the sociology of Open Source –37
economists have much to contribute.  They can provide subtle rationales for public 
and nonprofit action, for example by pointing at the existence of multiple equilibria in 
repeated  games.    They  can  apply  econometric  testing  to  many  relations  between 
variables.  They can help design innovative incentive mechanisms and institutional 
structures.  They may find in the present paper plenty of ideas to do these things.  In 
addition, the present paper is only one step in the direction of systemic analysis of the 
CG System – much more remains to be done here.
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